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1Delegation and Strategic Compensation
in Tournaments
Abstract
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers.
On the ﬁrst stage, the owners choose a linear combination of proﬁts and sales as
incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in
a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce
their managers to maximize proﬁts. In asymmetric equilibria, however, one owner
puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative weight.
21 Introduction
Theproblemoftheseparationofownershipfrommanagementinapubliclyowned
ﬁrm has been widely discussed. While it is well-known that owners should com-
pensate their managers according to proﬁts instead of sales in an isolated (static)
context, the same may not hold in a strategic context. For example, when ﬁrms
compete against each other, owners may wish their managers to act more ag-
gressively by putting a positive weight on sales in the managerial incentive con-
tracts. Some papers discussed the optimal strategic incentives for managers in an
oligopoly, assuming that owners can choose a linear combination of proﬁts and
sales. The results show that under Cournot competition it is optimal for owners to
put a positive weight on sales, whereas under Bertrand competition owners should
put a negative weight on sales.1
However, the Cournot and the Bertrand game are not the only forms of com-
petition for which the question of strategic incentives arises when owners have to
delegate decisions to managers. This paper combines the approaches of Fersht-
man and Judd (1987), and Lazear and Rosen (1981) to discuss the optimal linear
combination of proﬁts and sales when managers compete in a tournament game.2
Tournaments can be characterized as a rather strong form of competition. In the
context of managerial competition, ﬁrms may end up as tournament winners and
get high sales whereas losing ﬁrms only receive low sales. There are a lot of
3real situations that can be better described by tournament competition than by the
Cournot or the Bertrand model: for example, many cases in which ﬁrms must
spend resources in advance to compete for a highly proﬁtable order from a public
institution or from a private enterprise. Such situations can be often found in the
professional service sector (e.g., advertising ﬁrms compete for a given budget of
an industrial enterprise by elaborating proposals for a new publicity campaign).
This paper will show that in a symmetric equilibrium there are no strategic inter-
actions between the owners, who induce their managers to maximize proﬁts. This
result does not hold in the case of asymmetric equilibria. There, one owner puts a
positive and the other a negative weight on sales.
In Section 2, a general two-stage model of delegated competition in tourna-
ments is discussed. Section 3 considers a special case with quadratic costs and
uniformly distributed luck. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model and Results
In analogy to Fershtman and Judd (1987), a model with two risk neutral owners
and two risk neutral managers is considered where owner i (i = 1;2) chooses a
linear combination
Oi = iΠi + (1  i)Si (1)
4of proﬁts Πi and sales Si as incentives for his manager on stage 1 of the game with
i > 0.3 On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against
each other. This tournament subgame follows the basic model by Lazear and
Rosen (1981). The managers simultaneously spend resources i  0 to generate
a performance or outcome
qi = i + "i (i = 1;2); (2)
where "1 and "2 denote error terms that are i.i.d.. The usage of resources entails
costs to the ﬁrm according to c(i) with c0 () > 0 and c00 () > 0 (i = 1;2).
The winner of the tournament receives high sales SH, whereas the less successful
ﬁrm only gets low sales SL (< SH). Manager i wins when qi > qj (i;j = 1;2;
i 6= j). As in Fershtman and Judd (1987) there is no disutility of effort for man-
agers. Owners want to maximize their expected proﬁts and pay the managers their
reservation values in expected terms.4 Let g () denote the density function of the
composedrandom term"j"i: Forthis model, thefollowingresultcan be derived:
Proposition 1 Suppose the existence of a symmetric equilibrium on the tourna-
ment stage. Then there will exist a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in
the two-stage game where owners choose 
i = 1 and managers spend resources

i = c01 (∆S  g (0)) (i = 1;2) with ∆S = SH  SL.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5The proposition states that in a symmetric equilibrium each owner induces his
manager to maximize proﬁts. The intuition behind this result is straightforward:
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that on the tournament stage of the game (stage
2) manager i (i = 1;2) reacts according to 
i = c01 (∆S  g (0)=i). Thus, 
i
only depends on i and not on j, which implies that owner j cannot inﬂuence

i by strategically choosing his incentive parameter j. The best each owner can
do is to induce his manager to maximize proﬁts. Therefore, both owners choose

i = 
j = 1 in equilibrium.5
The equilibrium values 
i (i = 1;2) can also be interpreted intuitively: Since
c() is a convex function, c01 () increases in the sales spread ∆S (i.e., in the
spread of the tournament prizes) and decreases, when luck becomes more impor-
tant for the outcome of the tournament (i.e., when g (0) becomes small).6
While there is no strategic interaction between the owners in the case of a
symmetric equilibrium, the same does not hold for asymmetric equilibria:














ria will have the following properties: Either
(a) 




i=@i < 0; @
j=@i < 0; @
i=@j > 0;
@
j=@j < 0; or
(b) 
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 2 show that in the case of asymmetric equilibria one
owner puts a positive weight on sales whereas the other owner chooses a negative
weight. Since the two subcases (a) and (b) are rather similar, we can consider the
scenario (a), for example: Now, there is strategic interaction between the owners
(i.e., 
i (i;j) and 
j (i;j)), and owner j puts a positive weight on sales
(i.e., 
j < 1), whereas owner i decides to put a negative weight on sales (i.e.,

i > 1). Looking at the partial derivatives that describe the managers’ reactions
to the owners’ choices of i and j, respectively, this result can be explained






i=@j > 0) which both raises manager j’s probability of winning the
tournament. Owner i is in a quite different situation, because due to the strategic
interaction lowering i would result in both managers spending more resources in
the tournament (@
i=@i < 0 and @
j=@i < 0).
The inverse relation between 
i and i (or 
j and j, respectively) becomes
clear from the managers’ objective functions



















where ∆S = SH  SL, and G() denotes the cumulative distribution function of
"j "i. Thus, a small i (or j) leads to low costs and, thereby, to a more aggres-
sive behavior of manager i (or j) in the tournament, i.e. the manager spends more
resources, which results in a higher probability of winning. But there are also
negative spillover effects in the case of asymmetric equilibria, because increasing
one’s own expenditures 
i (or 
j) decreases the other manager’s marginal and
absolute probability of winning. In scenario (a), 
j < 1 makes manager j dis-
couraging manager i in the tournament by spending large resources 
j, whereas
in (b) the opposite holds due to 
i < 1.
The condition that g () has a unique mode at zero is not very restrictive. It
holds for a wide range of known probability distributions.7 For example, when "i
and "j are normally distributed with mean zero, the convolution g ("j  "i) is also
a normal distribution with mean zero.8 When "i and "j are uniformly distributed
over [¯ ";¯ "], the composed random variable "j "i is triangularly distributed over
[2¯ ";2¯ "] with mode at zero.
Unfortunately, the general model considered above does not allow concrete
statements whether an owner is better off in the symmetric or in the asymmetric
equilibrium. Therefore, a special case will be discussed in the following section.
83 A Special Case: Quadratic Costs and Uniformly
Distributed Luck
Inthissection, itisassumedthateachﬁrmi(i = 1;2)hasaquadraticcostfunction
c(i) = k
22
i, and that "1 and "2 are uniformly i.i.d. over [¯ ";¯ "] which implies a
triangularly distributed "j  "i over [2¯ ";2¯ "].9 Let, for simplicity, SL = 0. In the
case of a symmetric equilibrium with 
i = 



















4k¯ "2  ∆S
8k¯ "2 (6)
for the two owners. Because the two asymmetric scenarios are rather similar, the









∆S (i  j) + 4ijk¯ "2 (7)
on the tournament stage and


i = 1 +
∆S
4
jk¯ "2 , 





on the ﬁrst stage. The expressions for 
i and 
j show that the two owners have to
take notice of the strategic interactions on the tournament stage when choosing i
and j on the ﬁrst stage. Since ∆S < 4
ik¯ "2 must hold for the concavity of the
9managers’ objective functions on the tournament stage, we see that 
j(0;1) and

i > 1: Thus, owner j (owner i) puts a positive (negative) weight on sales.
Comparing the owners’ expected proﬁts for the symmetric and the asymmetric
equilibrium yields that owner j prefers the asymmetric to the symmetric equilib-
rium: His expected proﬁts are higher with an aggressively acting manager that
discourages the other manager in the asymmetric case than with a proﬁt maximiz-
ing manager in the symmetric case. On the other hand, there exists a critical value
∆ˆ S for the sales spread so that for ∆S > ∆ˆ S owner i prefers to have a defensive
manager in the asymmetric case to the symmetric case with a proﬁt maximizing
manager. For ∆S < ∆ˆ S the opposite holds. The intuition for the last result is
indicated by the expressions (5) and (6). Differentiating EΠi (






2k¯ "2  ∆S
4k¯ "2 . (9)
Equation (9) shows that owner i’s expected proﬁts decrease in the sales spread
for large values of ∆S in the symmetric equilibrium. This seems to be plausible,
because 
i raises in ∆S (see (5)) so that c(
i) becomes very large for large values
of ∆S.
104 Conclusions
This paper discusses a two-stage game with the owners choosing a linear combi-
nation of sales and proﬁts as incentives for the managers on the ﬁrst stage, and the
managers competing in a tournament on the second stage. The results show that,
contrary to the usual case of oligopolistic competition, there may exist a symmet-
ric equilibrium as well as asymmetric equilibria.10 In the symmetric equilibrium,
there is no direct strategic interaction between the owners, and each owner induces
hismanagertomaximizeproﬁts. Intheasymmetriccase, however, oneownerputs
a positive weight on sales whereas the other chooses a negative weight. Although
only simultaneously acting players have been considered on each stage, the spe-
cial case of Section 3 indicates that there may be a ﬁrst-mover advantage when
owners have to choose their incentive schemes sequentially: Then it can be prof-
itable to decide ﬁrst and put a positive weight on sales so that one’s own manager
becomes the aggressively acting one in an asymmetric equilibrium.
11Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
In the tournament subgame (stage 2) manager i (i = 1;2) wants to maximize
EOi (i) = iEΠi + (1  i)ESi; where Si = SH (Si = SL) if manager i is
the winner (loser) of the tournament. Since EΠi = ESi  c(i); the manager’s
objective function can be rewritten as EOi (i) = ESi  ic(i). Expected
sales are ESi = SHprobfi winsg +SL  [1probfi winsg] with probfi winsg =




where G() denotes the cumulative distribution function of "j  "i and g () its


























. The ﬁrst order conditions for the
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i (i;j) and 
j (i;j) denote the managers’ Nash equilibrium strategies


























































































































































































13Proposition 1 assumes the existence of a symmetric equilibrium 
i = 
j on the




















i = 0 in (A6) and @
i=@





01 (∆S  g (0)) and 

j = c
01 (∆S  g (0)). (A11)
Comparing (A10) and (A11) we see that the owners optimally choose 
i = 
j =





i = 0, and @
i=@
j = 0 the owners’ second order conditions
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Both equations, (A12) and (A13), consist of four terms. In each equation, the ﬁrst
term is quadratic and therefore positive; the second term is negative, because it
describes the managers’ second order conditions (A4) and (A5) for 
i = 
j = 1;




Proof of Proposition 2:
14Proposition2assumestheexistenceofasymmetricsubgameperfectequilibria.
First, we have to prove the signs of the partial derivatives for the two subcases (a)































































































































The sum D consists of two terms. The ﬁrst term is positive, because i;j > 0,
c00 () > 0, and the expression in brackets denotes manager i’s or manager j’s sec-





may be positive or negative, but the two alternative formulations of D show that
this does not matter. Then, from the managers’ second order conditions we obtain
@
i=@i < 0 (see (A14)) and @
j=@j < 0 (see (A17)) for both subcases (a) and
(b). The signs of (A15) and (A16) are different for the two subcases. In subcase
(a), we have 
i < 
j, so that 
i 
j is located at the left-hand tail of g (). Since,





> 0 in sub-
case (a). This implies @
j=@i < 0 (see (A15)) and @
i=@j > 0 (see (A16))
for subcase (a). In subcase (b), 
i  
j > 0 being part of the right-hand tail of





< 0 due to the unique mode of g () at zero. Therefore, in
subcase (b) we obtain @
j=@i > 0 (see (A15)) and @
i=@j < 0 (see (A16)).
Next, we have to prove that either
(a) 


























j because ofc0() > 0. It remains to showthat
j < 1 < 
i
in subcase (a), and 
i < 1 < 
j in subcase (b). Equations (A1) and (A2) yield


















with ∆ = 
i 
j. On the ﬁrst stage, using the partial derivatives (A14)(A17)
the owners’ ﬁrst order conditions (A6) and (A7) can be written as






















































































with Ωl = ∆Sg (∆)
lc00(
l) (l = i;j). Comparing (A20) and (A23) we see
that the owners choose 
i and 















































j) = 0: (A27)
Equation (A26) ((A27)) describes owner i’s (j’s) optimal choice of i (j). In
subcase (a), we have ∆ < 0 which yields g0 (∆) > 0 due to the assumption
of a unique mode of g () at zero. Thus, the ﬁrst term in (A26) is negative so
that the second term has to be positive which requires 1  
i < 0 , 
i > 1.
In (A27) the ﬁrst term is positive which requires the second term to be negative
and, therefore, 1  
j > 0 , 
j < 1. Altogether, in subcase (a) we obtain

j < 1 < 
i. In analogy, subcase (b) yields the inverse relation 
i < 1 < 
j
because here ∆ > 0, which implies g0 (∆) < 0 due to the unique mode of
g () at zero.
17Notes
1. See Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987). In a recent paper, Ishibashi
(2000) adds quality competition to the discussion of strategic incentives in
oligopoly. His results show that now choosing a positive weight on sales
may be beneﬁcial for owners under Bertrand competition. For a discussion
of relative performance evaluation of managers in an oligopoly see Fumas
(1992). For a survey of strategic delegation see Spulber (1992, pp. 566-
568).
2. Baik and Kim (1997) also discuss strategic aspects of delegation in contests,
which are not identical with tournaments considered here. Moreover, the
paper does not discuss the question, whether the owner should put a positive
weight on sales or not.
3. Owners will never choose i  0, since this would induce their managers
to spend countless resources. This becomes clear when looking at the man-
agers’ objective functions.
4. See Fershtman and Judd (1987), fn. 3 and 6. Thus, the compensation for
manager i can be described by Ai + BiOi (Bi > 0), where the parameters
Ai and Bi are chosen so that expected compensation just equals manager i’s
reservation value. However, we have to assume that managers dislike the
18spending of resources, because otherwise there would be no real conﬂict of
interests between owners and managers.
5. It is well-known in the tournament literature that the existence of equilibria
must be assumed in general; see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 845, fn.
2); Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983, p. 29); Lazear (1989, p. 565, fn. 3).
6. For the interpretation of g(0) see Lazear (1995, p. 29).
7. In addition, this assumption is not unusual in the tournament literature; see,
e.g., Drago, Garvey, and Turnbull (1996, p. 225).
8. See Wolfstetter (1999, pp. 343-344).
9. The derivations of the following results are relegated to an extended version
of the paper, which can be requested from the author.
10. Note that in the standard tournament model with two homogeneous and risk
neutral players there exists at most one equilibrium in pure strategies which
then must be symmetric; see Proposition 1.
11. The two managers receive their reservation values; see fn. 4.
12. For brevity, the managers’ equilibrium strategies are written as 
i and 
j.
13. See Chiang (1984, pp. 210-212).
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